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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT: A STUDY
OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COOPERATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*
Seymour J. Rubin"

INTRODUCTION
Some fourteen years ago, I wrote a rather pretentious article titled
"Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct" with
the probably even more grandiose subtitle "A Study of the Relationship
between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development."
With the decision to republish that essay, the editors of The American
University Journal of International Law and Policy have given me the
opportunity to "update" that piece. So much--and in some respects, so
little-has occurred in this long interval, that the privilege of later reflection cannot be disregarded. I have not been asked to rewrite that
article, nor would I wish to do so, but a brief comment seems to be in
order.
What seemed in the early 1980s to be a flood of meetings, conferences, and assorted punditry has in the interlude been dwarfed into a trickle. The visible evidence lies in a twenty-volume library on the subject
issued under the auspices of the United Nations Center on Transnational

* 30 AM. U. L. Rnv. 903 (1981). Reprinted with the permission of The
American University Law Review. All rights reserved.
** Honorary Vice President, American Society of International Law;, Honorary
Member, InterAmerican Juridical Committee; Judge, Administrative Tribunal,
InterAmerican Development Bank; Emeritus Professor of Law, in residence, Washing-

ton College of Law, The American University. B.A., 1935, University of Michigan;
LL.B., 1938, LL.M., 1939, Harvard University. Mr. Rubin was the United States

Delegate to the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations for the period of
1975-86.
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Corporations (UNCTC)--one of the all too few United Nations (U.N.)
entities whose absorption into a larger body one can rationally regret.
The subject continues to be of importance and not only because it still
gives employment to scholars, diplomats, economists, business school
professors, and, perhaps above all, lawyers. It also, especially these days,
has engaged those interested in health and environmental causes, as well
as industrialists and merchants.
Most of the passion, however, of the earlier writings has faded. The
debate of the 1960s, 70s, and even early 80s was one of "true believers." Views on the merits ("the transnational corporation is the engine
of progress") or the demerits ("poverty is the product") of the
transnational corporation (TNC) were held with religious fervor and
certainty, and led to evangelical prescriptions. This was the age of the
"new international economic order." Thus, the first (1977) sessions of
the UNCTC turned consideration of a sensible and moderate Group of
Eminent Persons report into a forum for a shouting match. The shouting took place, in the main, between the representatives of industrialized
nations (with their labor union leaders in vocal dissent) and, on the
other side, the representatives of the developing nations, urged on by
members of what was then the "Soviet bloc."
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of "market"
economies in the vast majority of nation-states,' the fire has gone out
of this controversy. Problems with broadly worded general principles,
chiefly where doctrine with respect to sovereignty confronts the asserted
preeminence of the still "rule of law", prevents agreement on a U.N.
Code. In a world, however, in which broad and doctrinal expropriations
are a distant memory (most "natural resources" have long-since been nationalized), and where the former left wing states are both privatizing
and comporting to attract foreign private and public investment, and in
which a web of bilateral investment treaties cover the globe,2 the original raison d'etre of the codes seems obsolete.
The reality is otherwise. Transnational corporations and the issues
surrounding their treatment and conduct continue as a worthy theme of

1. By the early 1990s, at least 83 countries were involved in some form of privatization. See Anna Gelpem & Malcolm Harrison, Ideology, Practice, and Performance in Privatization; A Case Study of Argentina, 33 HARV. INT'L LJ. 240, 240
(1992).
2. See generally Jesawald W. Salacuse, Bit by Bit: The Growth of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries,
24 INT'L LAW 655 (1990) (documenting the growth in bilateral investment treaties).
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serious international discussion. Thus, the following holds true:

a) Privatization and the triumph of the market do not by any means
diminish issues of transnationality. If, for example, TNC's in the past
were less than solicitous of the aspirations of developing states to build
viable self-sustaining and competitive economies, it can hardly be taken

for granted that the newly-adopted enthusiasm for privatization will be
accompanied by universal adherence to better business and ethical standards.3

b) In the days ahead, TNC's will have greater, not lesser, influence,
not only on domestic, but alas on international economies. This effect is
a concomitant of the lessening of governmental control or supervision,
and the integration efforts in many regions of the world.'
c) Regional and even global integration brings with it new challenges.
These are greater in the present age of electronic communication. For
example, transborder issues must be addressed to ensure honesty as well

as efficiency in the transborder securities market which now exists.'
Similarly, issues of transnational insolvency-reflecting the enormous

growth of transnational industry, including protection of and trade in
services-need to be faced, and national policies either harmonized or

reflected in international agreements.6

If the traditional issues-sovereignty, nationalization, standards of

compensation, regulation of business conduct-have been somewhat
reduced in intensity by the events and trends of the 1990s, they have

not been eliminated. They have been replaced by issues from those of
the environment to those of trade and investment. Most regional trade

3. See Edith Brown Weiss, Notes from the President, NEwS BuLL AM. SOc'Y
L. (Nov. 1994) (noting that TNC's are crucial in developing transnational practices and norms, in influencing government actions, in proposing alternative resolutions
to important issues and in implementing international business and economic norms).
4. See David Trubek et al., The Future of the Legal Profession: Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE NV. RES. L. REV. 407, 409 (1994) (arguing
that the combined importance of TNC's in the world economy and the growth of
privatization emphasizes a need to develop "market institutions, including legal structures, to facilitate economic interaction").
5. See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Compensation, 55 LAW & CONEMiP. PROBs. 157, 158-59 (1992)
(discussing the pro's and con's of securities regulation harmonization).
6. See generally Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International
Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. CoMp. L. 573 (1993) (discussing the problems associated with
the differences among reorganization systems when they affect the cases of debtors
with assets in more than one country).
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agreements now address these and other issues. The growth of transnational enterprise and of economic and social integration will guarantee
an important role for an international organ of consultation and normformulation. The relationship between international legal cooperation and
economic development remains important.
I. CORPORATIONS AND NATION-STATES:
A TENSE INTERACTION
The relationship between corporations and governments has often been
uneasy. Seldom is there general agreement that "what is good for General Motors is good for the United States." Indeed, it is appropriate to
recall, as already stated, that corporations historically were created only
by a special and guarded act of the sovereign. General and permissive
incorporation laws came late to the United States. Increasing industrialization, however, made it obvious that the corporation form of doing
business was a highly useful social and economic tool. The corporation
permitted the capital of many persons to be brought together, to guarantee to each investor that he would put at risk only an agreed and limited amount of capital, that such capital would be centrally managed, and
that the entity would survive the death of the natural persons who contributed either their capital or skills. The corporation thus responded to
the needs of society and hence its growth. Over the last few decades,
nearly the same set of considerations has dominated the exponential
growth of the "transnational corporation," an entity whose operations
extend beyond national frontiers.! TNC's have proliferated because they
are useful in a world in which efficiency often demands an outlook that
transcends national boundaries.
Even in the national arena, the corporation has sometimes exacerbated
fears. The aggregation of economic power that the device permits often
has been viewed as being powerful and not always responsive to popular concepts of the "best interests" of the general public. Separation of
investment and of management carries with it at least some possibilities
of abuse. The interests, for example, of labor and of consumers, and the
likelihood that corporate interests will not always coincide with the
public interest, have thus led to suggestion for reform of the institution
of the corporation and to a myriad of regulatory measures. One aspect
of this reformist sentiment has been the recurrent crusade in the United

7. Much of this and the following paragraphs owe a great deal to A. BERLE,
THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
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States for a federal incorporation law, in the belief that national standards are appropriate for entities that have country-wide operations. That
proposal has come to the fore at intervals since its incorporation in the
Democratic Party platform of 1908, yet it has never prospered. An analogous concept lies behind much of the present emphasis on international
regulation, as well as the proposals for a European Countries "Companies Law."
Though no federal general incorporation law exists in the United
States, there are many statutes and regulations that are applicable to
corporate conduct on a nationwide scale and which, if consolidated,
could well be called a corporate code of conduct. For example, the laws
that regulate the offering of securities by corporations8 and their sale to
the public determine what a cooperation may do to raise capital, and
what it must do to give information to its shareholders9 and to government. State legislation often exists concurrently." Moreover, labor laws
prohibit unfair labor practices; antitrust laws control mergers that may
conflict with the public interest; and other regulations affect such diverse
areas as standards of accountancy and protection of the environment.
In spite of this legislation, other public interest concerns arise. One
source of these concerns is that a corporation may be perceived as not
conferring benefits or costs equally on all regions of even a single country. The economic and political repercussions of uneven distribution of
natural resources, or other factors of comparative advantage, are evident
in many nations: in the United States, as industry moves out of the
Northeast to the so-called Sunbelt; in Britain, where Scottish nationalism
is fortified by oil discoveries; and in Canada, where separatism is fed
not merely by linguistic and perceived cultural differences, but also by
questions of who should profit from resources found in different parts of
the nation.
An entirely domestic corporation may thus find itself caught up in
such regional conflicts, and may be seen as serving the interest more of

8. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976) (regulating the public offspring of securities by requiring the issuer to make full disclosure of all material
facts in order to provide the public with adequate information regarding securities).

9. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). The Act applies to trading in securities that are already issued and are outstanding by imposing
disclosure requirements on publicly-held corporations and by prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
10. State securities laws, commonly called "Blue Sky Laws," establish various requirements for the registration of brokers/dealers, registration of securities to be offered or traded in the state, and sanctions against fraudulent activities.
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"foreigners" than of the natives of the resource-rich region in which it
operates. Consequently, tensions can be considerable. If the corporation
is transnational the tensions are greatly magnified, because the corporation is perceived as being one that owes its allegiance not merely to
another group within the same country, but to persons in another nation.
Benefits of TNC's are seen as remaining principally in one country,
with the costs-or the lack of benefits-in another. Further, when the
corporation is an entity that is foreign-owned and foreign-controlled, the
suspicion that regulation might bring a better order tends to harden into
conviction. That conviction is likely to become an article of faith when
the corporation has its headquarters in a developed nation, while maintaining many or most of its operations in developing countries." Moreover, the likely disparity in the standards of living between the two
countries powerfully exacerbates the human tendency to put more of the
blame on a foreign concern than on one's own shortcomings or on the
dictates of economics.
An additional factor brings transnational corporations under suspicion-the possibility that they may act as conduits for the policies of a
foreign state. 2 Though in most cases the corporation will be unwilling
to play such a role, that hardly matters. What does matter, for example,
is that the home government may seek to impose its antitrust laws on
host states. In addition, policies such as those embodied in the "trading
with the enemy" concept, which are concerned with embargo policies of
one country, might be imposed on subsidiaries in other countries. Corporations also may be asked to follow policies with respect to repatriation
of earnings that respond more to the needs of the home than of the host
country. This results in a feeling of "dependency" that may or may not
have undesirable economic aspects but that certainly is psychologically
unsettling.
Developing countries generally believe that an unjust international
economic order exists and that a transfer of resources is necessary to
correct the inequities. The developing countries also are aware of the

11. Cf. Seymour Rubin, Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and
International Incorporation, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 267 (1973).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (extraterritorial application of antitrust law); United States v. Imperial Chemicals
Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (liability), supplemented by 105 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (remedies); Societe Fruehauf v. Massardy [1965] J.C.P. II
No. 14, 247 (Cour d'appel, Paris). See generally Seymour Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1,
10 (1971) [hereinafter A Skeptic's Analysis].
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important role that TNC's play in the present international economic
system. 3 Hence the call for regulation. Such regulation would seek to
achieve several objectives such as rectification of past injustices; enhancement of the contribution which it is conceded that TNC's could,
and on occasion do, make to the development of the countries in which
they operate; and the creation of a balanced and equitable world economic order basically in accordance with the spirit of the several U.N.
resolutions that set out' 4a program for achievement of a "new international economic order.' 1
Both the interdependence of nations and the major role of TNC's in
international trade and investment are salient features of the international
economic landscape. The role of TNC's has been emphasized, and perhaps overly so. Although both proponents and critics agree on the importance of the TNC, there is no consensus on the effects of that importance. Some writers, such as Arnold Toynbee, regard the
transnationalism of the TNC as a beneficial means of overcoming nationalism, which they believe must be eliminated if the world is to
survive." Many have regarded the TNC as a threat to national sover-6
eignty, an attitude reflected, for example, in several Canadian reports,1
as well as in the opinions of representatives of the developing countries.
Others have perceived the TNC as an instrument of division that perpetuates an inequitable allocation of benefits that impoverishes the less
developed countries. Thus, the TNC may be regarded as widening disparities not only between nations, but also between economic classes
within a nation while simultaneously destroying indigenous cultural
patterns. Skeptics have argued that sovereign states have become actors
in a world situation in which they have limited power and freedom of
choice. 7
13. See CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DunTEs OF STATES, G.A. Res.
3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M 251 (1975); see also Reflections, infra note 19; U.N. Commission
on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in the
Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.1011976117 (1976).
14. For a dramatic and generally exaggerated exposition of the ill aspects of the
TNC, see R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINA-

TIONAL COIuRORAONS (1974). Contrast this with the considerably rosier attitude of
Robert Ball, The Promise of the Multinational Corporation, FORTUNE, Jan. 1, 1967.
15.

See, e.g., A. TOYNBEE, THE RELUCTANT DEATH OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTI'Y

(1971).
16. See, e.g., GovERNMrENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DmECr INVESTmN IN CANADA (1972) [hereinafter Gray Report].
17. A Skeptic's Analysis, supra note 12. See generally Report of the Group of
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Almost all nations agree on the desirability, if not the necessity, of
some form of international regulation of TNC's. Although there was
wide divergence in the attitudes toward TNC's among the members of
the Group of Eminent Persons established by the Secretary General of
the United Nations, they suggested in a 1974 report that the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations be established. In 1974, the U.N.
General Assembly created both the Commission and the Information and
Research Center on Transnational Corporations.' 8 The Commission,
composed of forty-eight U.N. members, held its first annual meeting in
the spring of 1975. The Information and Research Center began operations in time to present a set of documents to the second Commission
meeting in 1976.'"
In the work program of the Commission, preparation of a code has
always been a priority. The resolution establishing the Commission
assigned several other tasks to it, including the preparation of a comprehensive information system and the creation of a program of technical
assistance to developing countries, generally aimed at enhancing their
negotiating capacities. The Commission also was directed to work on a
definition of TNC's.' Work on the information system, including possible harmonization of accounting and reporting standards, has been
mainly in the hands of the Center, although some of the work on the
information system has been delegated to a special group set up to
analyze questions of accounting. The Commission itself has devoted
much time to discussing these matters.
Certain matters are thus far clear. Corporations themselves are impor-

Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on
International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. I, ST/ESA/6 (1974) [hereinafter Eminent Persons' Report]; United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development, Annex II, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/190, U.N. Sales No. E.73.11.A.11 (1973).
18. The Commission was established pursuant to ECOSOC Res. 1913, U.N.
ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. IA, at 31, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add. 1 (1974). The Information and Research Center was established by ECOSOC Res. 1908, U.N. ESCOR,
57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/5570 (1974).
19. For a general overview of the background and work of the U.N. Commission
on Transnational Corporations, see Seymour Rubin, Reflections Concerning the U.N.
Commission on TNCs, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1976) [hereinafter Reflections].
20. This writer has elsewhere suggested that definitions, to be useful in analyzing
and possibly solving problems, should describe functions rather than formal structure.
E.g., Seymour Rubin, The International Firm and the National Jurisdiction, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION: A SYMPOSIUM (C. Kindleberger ed., 1970) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL FIRM]; Seymour Rubin, InternationalRules for Transnational Corporations, 1 J. INT'L TRADE L. 1, 10 (1975).
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tant economic actors on both the national and international scenes. Their
international importance has increased enormously in recent years, just
as international trade, commerce, and investment have increased. 2'
Moreover, great benefits have been realized as a result of their activities.
The concerns of developing nations regarding the "more equitable"
distribution of resources and wealth are also great. TNC's often are as
concerned with issues of fair treatment-especially in light of numerous
expropriations (most prominently in the extractive industries), stability,
and an appropriate investment climate-as governments are concerned
with excesses or lack of responsiveness by TNC's to the national objectives of the host countries. Perceiving the advantages in a compact,
businesses and governments, host and home alike, agree on the desirability of a "code of conduct." It was with little difficulty, therefore,
that the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations was able to
agree at its Second Session to give priority to the preparation of such a
code.'
The content, form, and nature of such a code, however, is very far
from being agreed upon even after five years of discussion and negotiation. Some of the difficulties were foreseen from the outset; some
have been overcome; and some have developed out of the negotiation
process itself and out of a perceived need for acceptable definitions. The
code, whether it emerges as a consensual document or not, is likely to
have a significant effect on corporate-state relations.'
II. PROSPECTS FOR A U.N. CODE OF CONDUCT
The writing of a code of conduct will not be on a tabida rasa. Indeed, any code that is produced by the U.N. Commission on Transna-

21. See generally C. Kindleberger, The Multinational Corporation in a World of
Militant Developing Countries, in GLOBAL COMiPANIES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
WORLD BusINESS 70 (G. Ball ed., 1975); R. BARNET & R. MULLER, supra note 14;
INTERNATIONAL FIRM, supra note 20; R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISEs (1971).
22. Actually, the formulation of a code of conduct for transnational corporations
has been given a high priority by the Commission since its initial session. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the First Session, U.N. ESCOR, 59th
Sess., Supp. No. 12, at T 9, U.N. Doc. E15655, EIC.101975/6 (1975).
23. During the First Session, for example, views differed on whether the code
should take on a moral tone, should be obligatory and contain penalties for nonobservance, and whether the code should be addressed solely to TNC's or should also
contain "general principles guiding the policies of governments." See generally id.
91 41-50.
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tional Corporations obviously will reflect to some degree the considerable array of existing "regulatory" agreements or works in progress.
Indeed, some part of the U.N. Commission Code will be based on work
in other fora. It is likely that the provisions of the ILO Tripartite Declaration on social standards, the work of ECOSOC on illicit payments,
and the work already accomplished on restrictive business practices or
transfer of technology will provide a basis for code provisions in those
areas, or will be incorporated by reference in a code. 4
It seems evident that at least one of the basic issues that has divided
the Commission from the outset-namely, the mandatory or voluntary
nature of the code-has largely been decided in other fora. If a code
dealing with a relatively narrow range of issues, such as those of restrictive business practices (on which many nations already have national or
regional binding legislation) cannot be made "mandatory," there seems
little possibility that a code of the sort being negotiated in the Commission will be put into treaty form. Hence, formal national commitments
to matters as ill-defined as the broad commitment to "respect for
sociocultural objectives, values and traditions" of countries in which
TNC's operate, or those subjects to varying interpretation as "adherence
to economic goals and development objectives" would go unenacted.'
Indeed, the 1980 edition of the CTC Reporter alludes to the possibility
that the Commission and ECOSOC might decide to convene an international conference to deal with final adoption of a code. The Reporter
then notes that "[s]uch conferences are called, of course, not only for
the adoption of treaties, but also for the adoption of recommendations or
non-formally binding instruments."2" In the latter category, the CTC

24. One such existing set of regulatory principles that has been generally taken
as a broad statement of the position of countries of the Third World regarding TNC's
are the principles relating to the conduct of transnational companies put forward at
the third preparatory meeting of the Working Group on Transnational Enterprises of
the American Republics. Included in these ten principles were such guidelines as:
TNC's should be subject to the laws of host countries and the exclusive jurisdiction
of their courts; they should not serve as a policy instrument of a foreign state;
TNC's should contribute to the development of the host country; they should refrain
from restrictive business practices; and finally, TNC's should respect the cultural identity of the host country. Those principles have received support form the Group of
77. Reflections, supra note 19.
25. U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Work Related to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct: Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a
Code of Conduct on its Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Sessions, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1980162,
at 12 (1980).
26. 1 CTC REP. (No. 8) 4 (1980).
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Reporter includes the results of the UNCTAD conferences on restrictive
business practices (already concluded with a non-binding instrument) and
on transfer of technologyY
It does not follow, however, that a "voluntary" code would be ineffective. Frequently, references have been made in informal conversations
during meetings of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the code,
as well as the sessions of the Commission, to the possibility of a "zebra" code-one in which some provisions would be adopted as binding
international agreements, while others would be voluntary. But in view
of the position of many delegations that each part of the code is and
must be dependent on all other parts, and the confirmation of that
position by consensus at the 1980 Commission meeting, this seems an
unlikely solution. It is of course possible that some provisions will be
more precatory in nature than others. The more likely prospect would
seem to be that certain areas, addressed only in general terms in the
code, might be developed further in specialized meetings into standards
that could be the subject of collateral and perhaps binding agreements.
In any case, the legal effect of a multilaterally accepted code of conduct is a matter of some debate." It has been suggested that even unilateral declarations can create international "law." The effect of General
Assembly resolutions is similarly controverted, though the majority---or
at least more traditional-view is that obligations under the U.N. Charter
require Security Council action. Even codes explicitly declared to be
"voluntary," such as the OECD Guidelines, may establish norms of
conduct that would probably be observed-perhaps as much as if they
were formally "mandatory." On the other hand, codes explicitly worded
to create non-binding obligations may be considered interpretive of other
explicitly binding agreements."

27. Id.

28. This position is seen in the statements of the head of the United States delegation to the Frst through the Sixth Sessions of the U.N. Commission on TNC's,
who indicated that this proposition has been accepted. See U.N. Commission on
Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations:Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. EJC.1011976117 (1976).
29. See Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises, in 22 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1979).

30. Id. at 40 (pointing out that the "modalities" paper of the U.N. Center on
Transnational Corporations states that even a code adopted explicitly in non-binding
form can become "a 'source' of law for national authorities as well as for the transnational corporations themselves."); see U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Certain Modalities for Implementation of a Code of Conduct in Relation to its
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Moreover, making a non-binding code "effective" may blur the distinction between a voluntary and a mandatory code. Most international
fora, including the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations,
would agree that a code should be effective, and that it should be reviewed from time to time. There already has been considerable discussion as to whether the reviewing mechanisms of the OECD Guidelines,
that are explicitly voluntary and not designed to judge the conduct of
any individual corporation, have imported considerable compulsion into
those Guidelines." A generally accepted set of standards may eventually have as significant effect as a more formal commitment. Indeed,
because a formally adopted commitment is likely to be narrowly worded, the looser standards may be more effective in influencing conduct.
In any case, review of the effectiveness of such standards may ensure
that they do have the intended effects. Already it seems clear that the
conduct of corporations-in the field of public disclosure, for example,
and in the area of labor relations-has been affected significantly by the
existing understandings already mentioned, and by the continuing negotiations and complementary discussions in board rooms and in international organizations.
This ongoing debate indicates that the code negotiations have had and
will have effects, almost without regard to the eventual attainment of a
formal code. This is a comforting consideration, because attainment of a
universally accepted and comprehensive code still faces many hurdles.
The Sixth Session of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, on the final day of its 1980 session, adopted a resolution32 that
was designed to provide guidance to the Working Group in its preparation of a code that would be presented at the Seventh Session of the

Possible Legal Nature, U.N. Doc. EIC.10/AC.2/1978/9, at 8 (1978).
31. For a general discussion of this point in the context of a well-known case
BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1977). The OECD Guidelines have also evoked a

before the OECD, see R.

statement in the "authorized" summary of that case, to the effect that parts of the
Guidelines "though voluntary in origin, may . . . pass into the general corpus of
customary international law even for those multinational enterprises which have never
accepted them" (emphasis added). The summary, prepared by Dr. T.W. Vogelaar of
the OECD Secretariat, caused some consternation and controversy in at least some
governments of the OECD.
32. U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Progress Made Towards
the Establishment of the New International Economic Order and Obstacles That Impede It: The Role of Transnational Corporations (Draft Resolution II), 66 U.N.
ESCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1980/75 (1980).
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Commission. The resolution affirms the priority status of work on the
code, and maintains that it will be "an essential contribution in the
accomplishment of the goals of the new international development strategy and the new international economic order."'3 It also affims that
the code should be "effective, comprehensive, generally accepted and
universally adopted."' This may prove difficult to achieve, particularly
in light of the broad, difficult, and sometimes differently viewed concepts contained in other items listed for the guidance of the Working
Group. The purposes of the code are to associate TNC's effectively
within the new international order;, to reaffirm principles of respect for
national sovereignty, established policies of countries in which TNC's
operate, and for the right of the host countries to regulate and monitor
TNC activities; to foster TNC contributions to developmental goals; to
prohibit subversion or "interference in the internal affairs of countries
and other inadmissible activities"; to deal effectively with activities of
TNC's in South Africa and Namibia; to include "provisions relating to
the treatment of transnational corporations, jurisdiction and other related
matters"; to provide appropriate implementary provisions; and to be considered as an integrated whole. Some of these desiderata are viewed
quite differently by various members of the Commission. Most of the
industrialized countries, for example, would understand "treatment" to
mean "fair treatment," but how that concept would be defined by the
developing countries, especially by the Socialist or Communist countries,
is another matter. Furthermore, reasonable defense of rights guaranteed
by international law as conceived by one nation may be "interference"
to another. Other difficulties abound.
The overarching difficulty is to achieve agreement in broad terms on
matters of principle. Many negotiations over the course of the years
have demonstrated that countries, even those with widely divergent
social and economic systems, can come to agreement on specific issues
even though the results often are not completely satisfactory to either
side. Agreements generally are reached at least partially because both
sides are looking for a solution to enable them to get on with business,
not for a victory for the principles of either side. The proliferation of
international investment and international trade, a large part of which the
TNC's control, is evidence that the agreements-whatever may be the
disputes between the parties-are at least a modus vivendi. For example,
the dispute between the United States and Mexico that arose out of the

33. Id. at 11.
34. Id.

1288

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10:4

oil and agrarian expropriations of the 1930's has never been resolved in
principle. Both sides stand on their original and flatly opposed theories
of international law. Yet American investment in Mexico has grown-to
the apparent satisfaction of both countries-and Mexico is the third
largest trading partner of the United States.
The basic problem of agreement on a code of conduct then is precisely that it deals with principles, not with specific and identifiable cases.
The foreseeable consequences of establishing these principles, however,
are largely unknown, if not unascertainable. One cannot reasonably
predict just what factual situation will arise, or just how the general
principle will be applied to it. Nevertheless, imagination tends to emphasize the worst case scenario. The necessary vagueness of the language,
which in many diplomatic settlements is intended, understood, and a
useful aspect of a settlement, becomes a hazard of indefinable dimensions.3" Despite the guidance of the resolution adopted at the Sixth Session, difficulties remain in attaining a code that will be generally accepted, universally adopted, and uniformly interpreted.
If methods of interpretation, review, and possibly resolution of differences can be reconciled, there is reasonable hope that a code in draft
form can be offered to the 1982 session of the Commission." A considerable amount of progress has been made, though it has been slow
and has been made on the easier issues. Moreover, there has been a
measure of success in other fora-the ILO, the OECD, and UNCTAD,
for example. Corporate practice actually has tended to conform to the
standards being enunciated and without undue harm. Much discussion
has had the effect of taking at least some of the mystery and fear out of
the concepts. In addition, it is widely perceived that failure would have
a major and negative effect at a time when real and not merely verbal
cooperation is essential to the welfare of all. Achievement of a generally
acceptable code would not do a great deal to satisfy demands for a mas-

35. These issues have been dealt with at some length earlier. See Reflections,
supra note 19. The article discussed the differences that are likely to complicate the
future progress of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations in making proposals on a code of conduct. The controversial areas include the language to be used
in the Commission's report; identification of areas of concern; scope and nature of
information-gathering functions; technical cooperation; and the definition of a TNC.
36. Following the initial publication of this essay, a draft of the Code was presented to the Commission. U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Draft
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Report to the Special
Session, U.N. ESCOR, Annex II, at 12-27, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.l (1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984).
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sive transfer of resources from North to South, for such a transfer of
resources is not within the legal or economic power of privately owned
corporations. A code, however, would be at least one perceptible indicia
of cooperation.
Thus, although both content and timing remain largely undefined,
reasons exist on all sides to make a strenuous effort to achieve a code.
All have recognized that a code need not be engraved in stone, and instead that it may be an evolving set of understandings of varying nature.
Further, all recognize that, whatever may be the economic significance
of code provisions, achievement or nonachievement of a code will have
substantial psychological and political implications. A code may or may
not have important beneficial effects, but failure in this effort has very
grave risks. Not the least of these risks, from the point of view of the
industrialized countries and the TNC's themselves, would be the possibility that an unsuccessful code would nevertheless be adopted as a
resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. Although the majority opinion
is that such a resolution would have no binding effect, it would provide
a precedent for enactment of national or regional legislation. Moreover,
it would constitute a mandate to a U.N. Secretariat-in this case, the
U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations-which would then have
both the authority and the resources for preparation of a series of reports, research studies, and other activities designed to implement such a
resolution. This is a possibility that must be borne in mind by those
who feel that the code exercise itself is unrealistic--or worse.
The hope--and if realism prevails, the expectations-thus must be
that a code will be achieved. It may not be a thing of logical harmony
and beauty, but it will be at least something more than a finger in the
dike.

